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To Fix or Not to Fix:  
Copyright’s Fixation Requirement and the Rights 
of Theatrical Collaborators 
Carrie Ryan Gallia∗ 
In August 2004, an artistic partnership was born.1 Nancy 
McLernan, a playwright, and Jonathan X. Flagg, a producer, 
approached Edward Einhorn to direct the upcoming production 
of McLernan’s Halloween play, Tam Lin.2 Flagg offered Ein-
horn $1000 to direct the show, and Einhorn accepted.3 The par-
ties never signed a contract.4 Einhorn rehearsed the show for 
weeks in a process that blended dance, fight choreography, 
puppetry, and staging into a single, coherent production.5 Then, 
on the eve of the scheduled opening, Einhorn was fired.6 He 
was never paid.7 The show opened as scheduled, with an assis-
tant credited as director.8 Einhorn brought suit in federal court, 
asserting, among other claims in Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Pro-
ductions, that McLernan and Flagg infringed Einhorn’s copy-
right when they used his staging and choreography in the pro-
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 1. The story of the production of Tam Lin is detailed in Einhorn v. Mer-
gatroyd Productions, 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 192. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jesse Green, Exit, Pursued by a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, 
§ 2, at 1. 
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duction of Tam Lin.9 While the claim survived a motion to dis-
miss in April 2006,10 no court—in this or any other case—has 
ruled that a copyright for stage direction exists.11 
Financially, Tam Lin pales next to the big musicals.12 The 
big musicals, however, do no better when it comes to protecting 
the creative contributions of directors. In November 2006, a 
lawyer representing the director of the Broadway production of 
Urinetown: The Musical—which won three Tony Awards in 
2002, ran for 965 performances, and recouped its backers’ $3.7 
million initial investment13—sought fees and damages from the 
creative teams behind two Midwestern productions that had 
used the Broadway staging without permission.14 Both theaters 
responded by filing for declaratory judgments that they did not 
infringe the director’s copyright.15 
Tam Lin, on the other hand, was a small off-off-Broadway 
play that ran only ten performances,16 and none of the artists 
 
 9. Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
 10. Id. at 196. 
 11. Green, supra note 8. 
 12. Production costs for a Broadway show can run to $10 million. Todd 
Beamon, So, You Want a Piece of the Action?, BALT. SUN, June 16, 2003, http:// 
www.baltimoresun.com/entertainment/stage/bal-hairside061603,0,7540284 
.story. Theater producing, however, gives meaning to the adage that great risk 
reaps great reward: Cameron Mackintosh’s productions, including Les 
Misérables, The Phantom of the Opera, and Miss Saigon, have grossed more 
than $8 billion (more than the films Star Wars, Raiders of the Lost Ark, Juras-
sic Park, and Titanic combined). PBS, Broadway: The American Musical, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/broadway/print/p-lp3b.html (last visited Oct. 14, 
2007). 
 13. See Kenneth Jones, You Are Now Leaving Urinetown; Musical Hit 
Will Close Jan. 18, 2004, PLAYBILL, Nov. 3, 2003, http://www.playbill.com/ 
news/article/82546.html (reporting the length of Urinetown’s run); URINE-
TOWN: The Musical, http://www.urinetown.com/flash/home_1a.html (follow 
“Awards” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 14, 2007) (indicating the number of Tony 
Awards won by Urinetown); Variety.com, Legit Weekly Box Office, Week 34: 
Jan. 12–18, 2004, http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=legit_chart&page= 
legit_0304_34&dept=LEGIT (last visited Oct. 14, 2007) (detailing the financial 
status of Urinetown). 
 14. See Campbell Robertson, Creative Team of ‘Urinetown’ Complains of 
Midwest Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at E3. The letter was also drafted 
on behalf of the show’s choreographer and design team. Id.  
 15. Zachary Pincus-Roth, We’re Not Sorry: Chicago Urinetown Sues 
Broadway Team, PLAYBILL, Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.playbill.com/news/ 
article/104140.html. 
 16. Green, supra note 8. Contra Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. 
Supp. 2d 189, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (reporting the number of scheduled perfor-
mances as eight). In either event, the run of the show was limited to about one 
week. 
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involved brought “name-in-lights” star power to the team.17 The 
judge ruling on the motion to dismiss in Einhorn accused Ein-
horn of “making a federal case” out of “a dispute over $1,000.”18 
Einhorn saw it as seeking “a reasonable amount for [his] work 
as a director and for [his] property, which was used without 
compensation or consent.”19  
A significant amount of the theatrical work in this country 
happens at not-for-profit companies where art, not commerce, 
is the motivating factor.20 Minneapolis and St. Paul, for exam-
ple, have over two hundred not-for-profit theater companies21—
more per capita than any American city other than New York.22 
Even if artists are not motivated solely by money, all theatrical 
collaborators deserve the protections and rewards conferred on 
intellectual property through copyright law.23 The story of the 
production of Tam Lin is an extreme example of the pitfalls in-
herent in a copyright system that fails to protect the collabora-
tive contributions to theater, an economically and culturally 
important American art form. Despite the fact that economic 
and cultural progress are the two values contemporary copy-
right law exists to promote,24 the current legal framework ig-
nores the work of the theater director—the artist most respon-
sible for a theatergoer’s experience.25 The President of the 
 
 17. See Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (“The parties to this case all as-
pire to success in the theater.”). 
 18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. Edward Einhorn, Letter to the Editor, The Director’s View, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, § 2, at 2. 
 20. See THEATRE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, NOT-FOR-PROFIT THEATRE IN 
AMERICA: THE FIELD AT A GLANCE 1 (2007), http://www.tcg.org/Pdfs/Advocacy/ 
Field%20at%20a%20Glance%202007.pdf (noting that, in 2005, 111,000 people 
were employed by and 32,500,000 people attended productions at not-for-profit 
theater companies, which earned over $1.6 billion). 
 21. See Minneapolis Public Library, A History of Minneapolis: Theater, 
http://www.mpls.lib.mn.us/history/ae2.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2007). 
 22. TODD R. BERGER ET AL., INSIDERS’ GUIDE TO THE TWIN CITIES 219 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
 23. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property 
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 277–78 (1992) (arguing 
that indulging the restitutionary impulse by protecting intellectual property 
through nontraditional means could lead to a chill in creativity). 
 24. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ECONOMY 6 (2d ed. 2006). 
 25. See Helen Krich Chinoy, The Emergence of the Director, in DIRECTORS 
ON DIRECTING 17 (Toby Cole & Helen Krich Chinoy eds., rev. ed. 1973) (assert-
ing that directors have come to have “absolute control” over theater produc-
tions). 
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Dramatists Guild of America has described the issue of copy-
right protection for stage directors as the “most important” “le-
gal collision[]” he has encountered in his tenure at the helm of 
this professional association of playwrights.26 
Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated.”27 The work of a theater director is orig-
inal and authored; the doctrinal obstacle to protection is that it 
is not “fixed.” This Note argues that copyright’s current fixation 
requirement is flexible enough to render stage direction copy-
rightable as a derivative work. Part I looks at the history and 
purpose of the Copyright Act, with particular focus on the fixa-
tion requirement. Part II traces the relationship between copy-
right law and theater, including the evolution of directing.28 
Part III considers solutions to the issue of the intellectual prop-
erty rights of stage directors and argues that, given the lack of 
robustness in the fixation doctrine, the staging of a play is suf-
ficiently fixable to warrant protection under the Copyright Act. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
AND ITS FIXATION REQUIREMENT   
If not for the printing press, there would be no copyright 
protection. Prior to the introduction of the press in England in 
1476, copying by hand was laborious and rarely undertaken.29 
The printing press made it faster and cheaper to copy books, 
threatening the economic interests of both writers and booksel-
lers.30 Various protection schemes emerged in response to this 
technological advance, evolving by 1709 into the Statute of 
Anne, which gave authors a protectable right in the publication 
of their writings.31 
United States copyright law has its roots in the English 
tradition. Under the Statute of Anne, copyright protected au-
thors and their writings, as fixed by a printing press, and 
served dual purposes: economics, by granting authors the right 
 
 26. See John Weidman, Protecting the American Playwright, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 639, 639 (2007). 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 28. While this Note focuses on stage direction, much of its analysis may 
apply to other theatrical collaborators as well. 
 29. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 19. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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of publication, and culture, by “‘encourag[ing] . . . learning.’”32 
Similarly, the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause 
grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”33 Congress passed the first copyright statute and 
all of its subsequent progeny pursuant to this grant.34 In prac-
tice, the Copyright Act has kept pace with developments of new 
media and forms of expression not within the imagination of ei-
ther the framers of the Constitution or the drafters of succes-
sive iterations of the statute.35 The governing statute today is 
the Copyright Act of 1976, codified in title seventeen of the 
United States Code.36 Congress has amended the 1976 Act 
more than twenty-five times since its passage.37 
A. THE PURPOSE AND PHILOSOPHY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
The purpose of copyright protection in this country, as 
stated in the Constitution, is to promote progress.38 The domi-
 
 32. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 21 (quoting the Statute of Anne, 
1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.)). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 34. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1986). 
Congress passed the first copyright statute in 1790. Id. Judicial decisions have 
further refined the scope of copyright protection. Id. Compare Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (extending copyright pro-
tection to advertisements), and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 
632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) (extending copyright protection to belt 
buckles), with Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 
1148–49 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding a bicycle rack not copyrightable), and Hoehl-
ing v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979–80 (2d Cir. 1980) (find-
ing that historical facts are outside the reach of copyright protection). 
 35. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (tracing the extension of copy-
right protection to engravings, etchings, and prints; musical compositions; 
dramatic works; photographs; and other works of fine art); see also Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (extending copyright 
protection to photographs); Kramer, 783 F.2d at 432 (extending copyright pro-
tection to audiovisuals of computer games); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, 
Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983) (extending copyright protection to 
video games). 
 36. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1332 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). 
 37. COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 28–29. 
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 8 (“The Congress shall have Pow-
er . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for li-
mited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). No record survives of any discussion by the fra-
mers about the Intellectual Property Clause. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02 & n.4 (2007). 
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nant theory underpinning copyright law is instrumentalism.39 
Proponents of instrumentalism contend that creative produc-
tion requires an economic incentive; quite simply, “would-be 
producers of information need some assurance that copying will 
be limited” and that they, and only they, will be able to reap 
the rewards of their creation.40 In other words, an absence of 
copyright protection would lead to unchecked and uncompen-
sated copying, which would discourage creation.41 Instrumen-
talist theories by necessity minimize creative motivations such 
as “personal pride, self-fulfillment, or desire for self-
expression,”42 which do not respond as obediently to financial 
incentives. 
Natural law theory more sufficiently accommodates non-
economic motivations, including the cultural purposes that also 
underlie copyright protection. According to natural law theory, 
an author is morally entitled to ownership of her work because 
she created it.43 The writings of John Locke, which characterize 
the fruits of one’s labor as “properly his,”44 form the basis of 
this theory.45 Locke argues that ownership requires labor; the 
taking of an owner’s object entails the taking of labor, which 
harms the owner of the object.46 Professor Wendy Gordon ex-
tends Locke’s logic from objects to intangible intellectual prop-
erty, reasoning that, “if I . . . create a new intangible work of 
authorship or invention, you should not harm me by copying it 
 
 39. Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 
76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) (“In the United States, rights in works of author-
ship and inventions traditionally have been viewed as resting upon either a 
natural-law or an instrumentalist theory (or both).”). For a discussion of in-
strumentalist theories of copyright, see William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344–
47 (1989). 
 40. See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 222 (emphasis omitted). 
 41. See Cotter, supra note 39, at 7. 
 42. Hardy, supra note 40, at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. 
(arguing that such motivations are more amenable to “broad and unrestricted 
copying”). 
 43. See Cotter, supra note 39, at 6. 
 44. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
 45. See Cotter, supra note 39, at 6 n.20. 
 46. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 
1533, 1544–45 (1993). 
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and interfering with my plans for it. I therefore have property 
in the intangible as well.”47 
For the most part, however, United States intellectual 
property law does not require a demonstration of labor for the 
conference of rights.48 Alternatively, much European copyright 
law springs from an idea similar to—but distinct from—that of 
Locke, promulgated by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and 
Immanuel Kant.49 In this conception, an individual acquires 
property by attaching his will to an external object, which 
“comes to embody the owner’s personality.”50 The loss of such 
property affects the self and can be measured in terms other 
than diminution in wealth.51 An author, therefore, has the 
right to determine how she will communicate her creation.52 
The copyright laws of France, Germany, and other continental 
countries reflect this understanding of moral rights.53 
B. THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
Copyright, which under United States law inheres in “orig-
inal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression,” has two basic requirements: originality and fixa-
 
 47. Id. at 1545. 
 48. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (arguing that “a shock caused by a clap of thunder” can cause crea-
tion sufficient for copyright protection). 
 49. For a discussion of Hegel’s and Kant’s conceptions of property, see 
Cotter, supra note 39, at 7–9. 
 50. See id. at 7; see also GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY 
OF RIGHT 45 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (1821) (“Since prop-
erty is the embodiment of personality, my inward idea and will that something 
is to be mine is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end occupan-
cy is requisite.”). Hegel explains that one may take possession of a thing by 
grasping it, forming it, or marking it. Id. at 46. 
 51. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957, 1004 (1982). 
 52. See Cotter, supra note 39, at 8. 
 53. See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, Journal Officiel de la Répub-
lique Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1992, p. 8801, avail-
able in English translation at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/fr/ 
fr062en.pdf (“An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his au-
thorship and his work. This right shall attach to his person. It shall be perpe-
tual, inalienable and imprescriptible.”); Gesetz über Urheberrecht und ver-
wandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetze] [German Law Dealing with 
Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at 1273, last amended 
by Gesetz, July 22, 1997, BGBl. at 1877, art. 7 (F.R.G.), available in English 
translation at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/de/de078en.pdf (de-
scribing the scope of an author’s moral rights as encompassing reproduction, 
distribution, and exhibition). 
RYANGALLIA_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:15 AM 
238 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:231 
 
tion.54 An author’s work can be copyrighted only if it fits within 
the statutory definition of copyrightable subject matter; other-
wise, it falls into the public domain and can be used by all.55 Al-
though originality is the sine qua non of copyright, the thresh-
old is low and a work that “possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity” will satisfy this requirement.56 The fixa-
tion requirement presents the real hurdle when it comes to ex-
tending copyright protection to the work of theater directors. 
The evolution of fixation and recent efforts to harmonize Unit-
ed States copyright law with international standards demon-
strate a trend toward relaxing the fixation requirement. 
1. The Development of the Contemporary Fixation 
Requirement 
The Copyright Act makes protection contingent upon fixa-
tion.57 The idea of fixation has its roots in the printing press, an 
understanding promulgated by the Supreme Court in its hold-
ing in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.58 The 
Court held that player piano rolls, readable only by machine, 
were not copies for the purposes of the Copyright Act, which 
required a copy to be a “printed record . . . in intelligible nota-
tion.”59 Congress, not happy with the result, created a compul-
sory licensing scheme in order to compensate artists in the face 
of such “mechanical” reproductions.60 In the 1976 Act, Congress 
did away altogether with the “artificial and largely unjustifia-
ble distinction[]” that made copyright protection dependent 
upon the form of fixation.61 
Instead, the 1976 Act shifts the emphasis away from the 
means and toward the effect of fixation, defining it as an “em-
bodiment in a copy . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to per-
 
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 55. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966–68 
(1990). Professor Litman argues that the public domain is more complicated 
than the lay understanding of it, serving in fact as a “critical buttress to the 
copyright system.” Id. at 977. 
 56. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991). 
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that “original works of authorship” must be 
“fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression”). 
 58. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 59. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 47. 
 61. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5665. 
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mit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.”62 While the use 
of the word “Writings” in the Intellectual Property Clause sug-
gests that fixation is a constitutional requirement,63 courts 
have never limited copyright protection to works that are “writ-
ten,” as that term is traditionally understood.64 Nor has Con-
gress, as evidenced by the extension of fixation in the Copyright 
Act to “work[s] consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are 
being transmitted . . . if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission.”65 While courts and Con-
gress have interpreted “Writings” liberally, they have taken the 
idea of “transitory duration” literally, finding temporary, even 
momentary fixations sufficiently fixed for copyright purposes.66 
Today, the fixation requirement does not dictate the me-
dium in which a work must be fixed, as long as that work is ca-
pable of being perceived.67 This functional goal is furthered by 
Congress’s intention that fixation encompass live broadcasts 
recorded at the same time they are being transmitted.68 While 
the definition of fixation seeks to exclude from protection “pure-
ly evanescent or transient reproductions,” the simple and for-
 
 62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 
561 (1973) (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or 
printed material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of 
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.” (citing Burrow-Giles Li-
thographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884))). 
 64. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1447 (11th ed. 
2003) (defining “write” as “to form (as characters or symbols) on a surface with 
an instrument (as a pen)”); see also Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (holding pho-
tographs copyrightable); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 
519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding computer software copyrightable). 
 65. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
 66. See MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 (concluding that the “loading of copy-
righted software into RAM creates a ‘copy’ of that software in violation of the 
Copyright Act” (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 594 F. 
Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984))). 
 67. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5665 (“Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or me-
dium of fixation may be—whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pic-
tures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physi-
cal object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or 
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by 
means of any machine or device ‘now known or later developed.’”). 
 68. Id. at 52–53, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665–66. The Copy-
right Act defines transmission as the communication of a performance or a 
display “by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received 
beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
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malistic act of recording a transient broadcast, while not alter-
ing or enhancing the underlying work, renders it eligible for 
copyright.69 On the other hand, the simultaneous recording of a 
live—as opposed to broadcast—theatrical performance does 
not, under current law, extend copyright protection to that per-
formance.70 
2. The Harmonization of the Fixation Requirement with 
International Standards 
While most countries require some measure of originality 
before protecting a work, the fixation requirement is decidedly 
American.71 In general, countries like the United States with a 
common law copyright tradition require fixation; civil law coun-
tries do not.72 Professor Ysolde Gendreau argues that the fixa-
tion requirement reflects the evolution of a country’s copyright 
law and suggests that a country that has abandoned fixation 
has a “‘more modern version of copyright.’”73 France, for exam-
ple, initially required fixation but now has abandoned it entire-
ly as a prerequisite to copyright protection.74 
After amending the Copyright Act in 1976, Congress took 
steps to harmonize United States copyright law with the rest of 
the world. In 1994, the United States joined the other member 
nations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and signed the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).75 The TRIPS Agreement considers 
intellectual property a key part of international trade.76 At the 
same time, Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement requires all WTO 
 
 69. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5666. 
 70. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.08(c)(2) (reading the 
Copyright Act as limiting copyrightability through simultaneous recording to 
material “being transmitted”). 
 71. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 47. 
 72. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT § 5.1.1.4 (2001). 
 73. Id. (citation omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
pt. I, art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]; World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2007) (showing that the United States’ membership became effective 
on January 1, 2005). 
 76. World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and En-
forcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2007). 
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members to comply with the Berne Convention, with one im-
portant exclusion: adoption of the moral rights conferred under 
Article 6bis is optional.77 Unlike the Copyright Act, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not require that copyrightable works be fixed 
in some way. Instead, the incorporated Berne Convention al-
lows each signatory to determine whether it will require fixa-
tion “in some material form.”78 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) is 
an example of United States harmonization with international 
law.79 The Berne Convention requires that copyright protection 
last for the life of the author plus fifty years.80 By extending the 
United States copyright term to life plus seventy years under 
the CTEA, Congress “sought to ensure that American authors 
would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their 
European counterparts.”81 Congress’s adoption of the CTEA 
and subsequent harmonization with international standards 
was motivated in large part by the lobbying of the culture in-
dustry.82 
Harmonization has led to a relaxation of the fixation re-
quirement in United States copyright law. For example, the 
TRIPS Agreement and the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation Performances and Phonograms Treaty extend protection 
to live performance.83 In light of this protection, Congress 
amended the Copyright Act to include § 1101(a), the “anti-
bootlegging” provision, which prohibits the unauthorized fixa-
 
 77. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 75, pt. II, § 1, art. 9(1); see also Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, July 24, 
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“Independently of the 
author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the au-
thor shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputa-
tion.”). The United States implemented some of the 1971 revisions of the 
Berne Convention before signing the TRIPS Agreement. See Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. 
 78. See Berne Convention, supra note 77, art. 2(2). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 108, 203, 301–04 (2000)). 
 80. Berne Convention, supra note 77, art. 7(1). 
 81. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003). 
 82. COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 159. Disney executives, dreading the 
prospect of Steamboat Willie falling into the public domain, voiced their sup-
port of the CTEA in testimony before Congress. Id. 
 83. See Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, 112 Stat. 2860, 36 I.L.M. 76; see also TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 75, pt. II, § 1, art. 14(1). 
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tion or distribution of live musical performance.84 In effect,  
§ 1101(a) grants copyright protection to something fleeting and 
transitory—a live performance—which does not fall within the 
purview of “writings.” While courts have disagreed about Con-
gress’s authority to so define copyright under the Intellectual 
Property Clause, § 1101(a) represents a relaxation of the fixa-
tion requirement and a resulting expansion of copyright, or 
copyright-like protection, to live performance.85 
Case law also reflects a dilution of the fixation require-
ment, with some cases even suggesting that live performance 
may be copyrightable.86 Computer programming cases have 
provided a particularly powerful catalyst, owing to the transito-
ry nature of digital files and transmissions.87 In relaxing fixa-
 
 84. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 512, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4974 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000)); H.R. REP. NO. 103-
826, pt. 1, at 8 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3780. 
 85. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding Congress’s power pursuant to the Commerce Clause sufficient to sup-
port an anti-bootlegging statute that would not satisfy the Copyright Clause’s 
fixation requirement); Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding constitutional underpinnings for 
the anti-bootlegging statute not in the Intellectual Property Clause but the 
Commerce Clause, which “has been interpreted broadly in the modern era”). 
But see United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (holding that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to pass legisla-
tion that reaches beyond the scope of the Copyright Clause), vacated, 492 F.3d 
140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 86. See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 
F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that a baseball game might satis-
fy the requirements of copyright); Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. CV-00-02279 
CAS (JWJX), 2000 WL 979664, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (finding protec-
tion for a live, unbroadcast, unrecorded movie pitch fixed in note cards and an 
outline); Zen Music, Inc. v. CVS Corp., No. 98 Civ. 4246 DLC, 1999 WL 
605462, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1999) (finding a song recorded prior to its live 
performance fixed for copyright purposes). But see Medforms, Inc. v. Health-
care Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
fixation requires something more than rote transcription, which lacks original-
ity, for copyright to adhere); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 
622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (refusing to extend copyright to a pa-
rade); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 1.08(c)(2) (finding live perfor-
mance outside the protection of copyright law). 
 87. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (finding perception by a “machine or device” sufficient fixation for 
copyright purposes); Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110–12 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (finding an audiovisual display sufficiently fixed for copyright pur-
poses in the form of a computer file that is “an exact, down to the last detail, 
description”); Firooyze v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124–25 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[C]omputer programs in general come within the subject 
matter of copyright.”). 
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tion, however, courts have not lost sight of the fixation re-
quirement’s functional purpose, noting the importance of fixa-
tion to proving an infringement cause of action.88 The actions of 
Congress and the courts in relation to the fixation requirement 
suggest that, as long as the goals of copyright law are advanced 
and a work is perceptible, reproducible, or otherwise commu-
nicable, fixation can be relaxed and still satisfy constitutional 
mandates. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN THEATER 
DIRECTION AND ITS RELATION TO COPYRIGHT LAW   
Congress first extended copyright protection to dramatic 
scripts in 1856.89 The existence, let alone prominence, of the 
theater director is a much more recent phenomenon. Copyright 
law has not kept pace with the emergence of the director as the 
primary player in American theater, leaving the contributions 
of this essential, creative artist without recognition or protec-
tion. 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DIRECTOR IN AMERICAN THEATER 
By the time Congress passed the 1909 Copyright Act, the 
role of the director had just begun to emerge in Europe.90 Prior 
to that time, plays were staged, often successfully, without a 
single figure tasked solely with integrating the script, the per-
formance of the script, and the audience experience into a sin-
gle, unified whole.91 The mantle of preparing a script for per-
formance often fell to the playwright.92 The ancient Greek poet 
Aeschylus, for example, choreographed his plays, rehearsed the 
text with the actors, and arranged the costumes.93 Shakespeare 
coached the actors who performed in his plays.94 Molière cast 
the actors for each of his plays and then critiqued their inter-
 
 88. Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 702–03. 
 89. COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 24. 
 90. See Chinoy, supra note 25, at 3. 
 91. Id. at 3–4. 
 92. Id. at 4. 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. Id. Hamlet’s advice to the players who visit Elsinore articulates a phi-
losophy of acting. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, 
PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 2, at 129 (T. J. B. Spencer ed., Penguin Books 
1980) (“[O]’erstep not the modesty of nature. For anything so o’erdone is from 
the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to 
hold, as ’twere, the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn 
her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.”). 
RYANGALLIA_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:15 AM 
244 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:231 
 
pretations of the roles he had written.95 These writers 
represent three of the golden ages of drama, where “writing 
and staging a play were a single creative process.”96 At other 
times, an actor would serve as manager of his fellow perfor-
mers, maintaining order and supervising performances.97 
In the nineteenth century, the performance of plays 
emerged as a vibrant form of expression in its own right.98 The 
growing prominence of live performance reflected a new sophis-
tication in the elements of staging—rehearsals, actors, and 
scenic elements—under a director’s control.99 The director be-
came more important as the modern world fragmented values 
and mores, since a homogenous society does not need an artist 
to provide unity in the way a heterogeneous society does.100 
Regardless of the reason, directors began experimenting 
with elements of production other than the script.101 Shakes-
peare’s plays, for example, so familiar to audiences, became 
canvases on which directors tried new techniques.102 Directors, 
like other artists, dabbled in different movements, such as na-
turalism and expressionism.103 Continental Europe took the 
lead, producing innovative, visionary directors,104 but by the 
twentieth century the new art form had gained traction in the 
United States.105 As the position of the director took hold, the 
work of American directors explored artistic, social, and politi-
cal ideas.106 Today, a theatergoer in this country would be hard 
 
 95. Chinoy, supra note 25, at 6 (observing that Molière’s play Impromptu 
at Versailles functions as a primer for modern directors). 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. Id. at 3; see also GLYNNE WICKHAM, A HISTORY OF THE THEATRE 11–
14 (2d ed. 1992) (crediting actors and managers with infusing “the breath of 
life” into the “dynamic and provocative art” that is the theater). 
 98. Chinoy, supra note 25, at 17. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 14 (“The decay of a universal system of values and a traditional 
way of life at the beginning of our modern era deprived theater of its homoge-
neous and representative public and of its accepted conventions for mirroring 
a shared human experience.”). 
 101. See id. at 20. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 45. 
 104. See id. at 58–73 (detailing the work of Russian, German, French, and 
English directors). 
 105. See id. at 73. 
 106. See id. at 73–74. 
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pressed to attend a performance not helmed by a director.107 
The director’s contribution is comprehensive and conceptual, 
determining how a script is presented to an audience.108 On a 
practical level, her task includes studying the script, casting 
and rehearsing the actors, and coordinating the physical design 
of the production.109 The production the audience sees is the fi-
nal product of the director’s many efforts. 
Prominence cuts both ways; as directors have become an 
increasingly influential force in the American theater, imitators 
have copied their work in other productions.110 The few law-
suits brought by directors asserting property interests in their 
work settled out of court.111 No court has extended copyright 
protection to the contribution of a director to a theatrical pro-
duction. 
 
 107. A search of the 2006–07 seasons at five American theater companies 
turned up not a single production without a director. See Brian Scott Lipton, 
The Wiz and Zhivago Slated for La Jolla’s 2006–2007 Season, THEATER MA-
NIA, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.theatermania.com/content/news.cfm/story/7463; 
Press Release, Wilma Theater, The Wilma Theater Announces Its 2006–2007 
Season (May 2006), available at http://www.wilmatheater.org/newsroom/ 
pressreleases/Wilma%2006-07%20Season%20Release.pdf; Berkeley Repertory 
Theatre, 06/07 Season, http://www.berkeleyrep.org/season/0607/index.asp (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2007) (follow hyperlinks to individual shows); Guthrie Theater, 
2006–2007 Season, http://www.guthrietheater.org/learn/study_guides/2006_ 
2007_season (last visited Oct. 14, 2007); Long Wharf Theatre, 2006–2007 Sea-
son, http://www.longwharf.org/season_06-07.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007). 
 108. See Carrie Ryan, Translating The Invention of Love: The Journey 
from Page to Stage for Tom Stoppard’s Latest Play, 24 J. MOD. LITERATURE 
197, 198 (2000/2001) (noting that the director conceives “an overall interpreta-
tion of the script that guides the transition from page to stage”). 
 109. Id.; see also Laurence Olivier, The Olivier Method, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
1960, reprinted in DIRECTORS ON DIRECTING, supra note 25, at 413 (describing 
the “chief business of the director” as providing “a point of view on the shape, 
meaning, and rhythm of the play”); Joseph Papp, Modernity and the American 
Actor, 45 THEATRE ARTS 63 (1961), reprinted in DIRECTORS ON DIRECTING, su-
pra note 25, at 432 (highlighting the importance of casting, wherein the 
“choice of actor . . . determine[s] the style of . . . productions”). For examples of 
directors discussing their artistic processes, see generally the twenty-one in-
terviews in ARTHUR BARTOW, THE DIRECTOR’S VOICE (1988). 
 110. See, e.g., Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (assert-
ing that the defendants “intentionally recreated [the plaintiff ’s] unique direc-
tion and staging including the replication of the stage movement, design, light-
ing, and sound” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Talia Yellin, New 
Directions for Copyright: The Property Rights of Stage Directors, 24 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 317, 328 (2001) (relating the assertion made by director Ger-
ald Gutierrez that his direction of The Most Happy Fella had been copied). 
 111. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 345. 
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B. PLAYMAKING AND COPYRIGHT 
The goal of copyright is to grant authors the right to pro-
tect and profit from their creations.112 Currently, however,  
copyright neglects the author of a live theatrical production—
the director. The playwright has copyright in the script she 
writes as a “dramatic work.”113 Choreography, often incorpo-
rated into the staging of both plays and musicals, is also pro-
tected by the Copyright Act.114 Yet stage direction, primarily 
because it is not considered fixed, is not currently recognized as 
worthy of copyright protection.115 Because the director is the 
author of the production the audience sees, however, copyright 
provides the most appropriate framework for protecting that 
work of authorship. 
Given the shortcomings of copyright law, directors are 
most commonly compensated contractually for their creative 
contributions to a production.116 This solution leaves much 
work unprotected because it favors directors with the promi-
nence and power to command a strong negotiating position. 
The translation of a script from page to stage is, inherently, an 
act of collaboration, but copyright’s joint authorship scheme, 
like contract law, does not extend protection far enough. Ulti-
mately, a director, based on the playwright’s underlying script, 
authors a derivative work entitled to copyright protection. 
1. The Insufficiency of Contract 
In theory, a private agreement could protect the intellec-
tual property interests of a theater director, and some commen-
tators look to contract law as an attractive means of solving 
this problem without resort to the complexities of copyright 
law.117 Most courts faced with a contract dispute seek to give 
effect to the intent of the parties.118 Therefore, as long as the 
parties to a contract agree that the director’s contributions are 
to be protected, courts should honor this choice. 
 
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3). 
 114. Id. § 102(a)(4). 
 115. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 318–23. 
 116. See Weidman, supra note 26, at 653. 
 117. See Matthew Rimmer, Heretic: Copyright Law and Dramatic Works, 2 
QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 131, 133 (2002). 
 118. See Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 128 (1877) (holding that contracts 
“must receive a reasonable interpretation consonant with the apparent object 
and plain intent of the parties”). 
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Two basic contractual models govern the intellectual prop-
erty interests of theatrical collaborators: the artist-driven mod-
el and the union- or guild-driven model. In the artist-driven 
model, a playwright agrees to share a portion of her royalties—
on the current production, for future productions, or both—with 
her collaborators. The collaborators who most often benefit 
from such contractual relationships are directors and drama-
turgs.119 For example, the Tony Award- and Pulitzer Prize-
winning playwright Tony Kushner agreed by contract to share 
fifteen percent of his royalties on Angels in America with the 
two dramaturgs who helped him develop the piece.120 Similarly, 
the Tony Award-winning director Joe Mantello protects his in-
terests by entering a contract with a playwright that entitles 
him to a small portion of the author’s subsidiary rights.121 
The artist-driven model has two shortcomings. First, the 
director needs to be powerful enough to negotiate successfully 
for a portion of the author’s royalties. Second, the author must 
be successful enough to afford to part with a portion of her 
royalties. The collaborator in this model is not earning an inde-
pendent royalty to reflect her artistic contribution to the pro-
duction. Instead, she takes a share of the author’s earnings. 
Kushner’s model works because he earned enough on Angels in 
America to allow him to share fifteen percent of his earnings 
with his dramaturgs. Perhaps more importantly, Kushner, a 
critic of the “myth of the Individual” steeped in Marxism, ad-
mits that had he “written these plays without the direct and 
indirect participation of [his] collaborators, the results would 
have been entirely different and much the poorer for the depri-
vation—would, in fact, never have come to be.”122 Mantello, on 
the other hand, is able to make “side agreements” with the au-
thors with whom he works because he is a successful, ac-
claimed director whose participation in a production ensures 
higher visibility and an increased chance for commercial suc-
cess. 
 
 119. See Susan Jonas & Geoff Proehl, Preface to DRAMATURGY IN AMERI-
CAN THEATER: A SOURCE BOOK, at vii, vii (Susan Jonas et al. eds., 1997) (de-
fining “dramaturg” as an artist who fulfills a number of different roles in the 
theater, including season selection, play development, audience enhancement, 
and production collaboration). 
 120. Rimmer, supra note 117, at 140. 
 121. Green, supra note 8. 
 122. TONY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERICA, PART TWO: PERESTROIKA 150 
(1994). 
RYANGALLIA_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:15 AM 
248 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:231 
 
In the case of Edward Einhorn and the production of Tam 
Lin, the stakes were simply too low for a contractual solution. 
None of the players were well-known or successful; Einhorn 
was working for just $1000 with no written contract at all, let 
alone an exceptional agreement that would have given him a 
portion of McLernan’s author’s royalty.123 It is not unreasona-
ble to speculate that Einhorn may have been happy simply to 
have been offered the job and did not dare jeopardize the oppor-
tunity by asking for more. While on a purely economic level 
Einhorn may have gotten what he bargained for—in this case, 
not much—such reasoning sanctions the exploitation of the 
player whose work is essential to the translation of a script 
from page to stage. Furthermore, this justification extends fair 
compensation only to those directors already established 
enough to negotiate for a share of royalties in addition to their 
relatively generous salaries. 
The union- or guild-driven model pits the standard agree-
ments of two professional organizations against each other. The 
Dramatists Guild’s position states that the playwright “owns 
and controls the intellectual property, including copyright, of 
the author’s script and of all changes of any kind whatsoever in 
the manuscript, title, stage business or performance of the 
play.”124 Directors, represented by the Society of Stage Direc-
tors and Choreographers, contend that they are the “sole and 
exclusive” owners of their own intellectual property.125 In most 
professional productions, the playwright and director are 
represented by these contradictory agreements, and no disa-
greement over intellectual property rights arises.126 Were an 
issue to arise, however, the practical effect of these contracts 
provides little to no clarity. 
 
 123. See Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 124. Policy Statement, Dramatists Guild of America, Dramatists’ Copy-
right and Intellectual Property Rights (2000), http://dramatistsguild.com/ 
content.aspx?id=public_policy_copyright&level=1. 
 125. Artist Employment Agreement, Society of Stage Directors and Cho-
reographers, available at http://www.ssdc.org/Special2007.pdf. 
 126. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 341–43, for a discussion of the conflicts 
between the Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers (SSDC) Model 
Agreement and the Approved Production Contract used on Broadway, which 
specifically grants authors all rights to any changes in their plays. Yellin ob-
serves that the SSDC Agreement “is not intended to alter, diminish, or affect, 
in any way, any of the Author’s rights in the play,” further complicating the 
conflict between the various industry standard agreements. Id. 
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Neither the artist-driven model nor the union- or guild-
driven model is a satisfactory answer to the challenge of pro-
tecting a director’s intellectual property. Contract law cannot 
reward the work of a director who innovatively stages a produc-
tion of a play in the public domain. In that case, the playwright 
is not entitled to royalties because her work enjoys no copyright 
protection, and therefore she cannot share her royalties with a 
director. Furthermore, a contractual solution speaks to the di-
rector’s contribution only in the short term; a portion of royal-
ties might compensate a director for a single production, but it 
would do nothing to prevent others in the future from copying 
the director’s work without credit or payment. Therefore, con-
tract, because it depends on the individual players, does not 
solve the challenge of protecting the contributions of collabora-
tors to theatrical production. 
2. The Limitations of Joint Authorship 
Staging a theatrical production is an inherently collabora-
tive endeavor. When authors collaborate, the product of that 
collaboration can receive copyright protection as a “joint 
work.”127 All authors of a joint work are co-owners of the copy-
right, each with an equal and undivided interest in the 
whole.128 The Copyright Act defines a joint work as “a work 
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.”129 To qualify as joint authors, not on-
ly must each collaborator contribute independently copyrighta-
ble material to the whole, but she also must intend to be consi-
dered a joint author.130 In Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, the 
Seventh Circuit held that “[t]o qualify as an author, one must 
supply more than mere direction or ideas.”131 The intent to be 
considered a joint author can be determinative. In Thomson v. 
Larson, the court gave great weight to a playwright’s repeated 
assertions that he alone wrote the Broadway musical Rent, ul-
timately finding a dramaturg who contributed actual language 
to the text of the play not to be a co-author of the work.132 
 
 127. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005). 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
 129. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
 130. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 131. Id. at 1071. 
 132. 147 F.3d 195, 204–05 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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The joint authorship idea is particularly attractive in the 
world of theater where the dominant conception of the direc-
tor’s job is to “make the stage speak with one voice” in order to 
elicit a “unanimous reaction” from a diverse audience133—not 
unlike the “unitary whole” imagined by the Copyright Act’s def-
inition of “joint work.”134 A number of commentators have ex-
plored a joint authorship solution to the issue of protecting the 
rights of stage directors.135 
The fact that courts strictly apply the intent requirement 
for joint authorship, however, presents an obstacle to relying on 
this scheme to protect the contributions of directors. Many 
writers, while eager to work with a director, may not be as ea-
ger to view that artist as an actual co-author of the play. Even 
Tony Kushner, who openly acknowledges and credits the con-
tributions of his collaborators, goes to great pains to “shore up 
[his] claim to authorship” of his plays.136 Thomson v. Larson 
demonstrates how readily an author’s exhortations of sole au-
thorship may be used to defeat a claim of joint authorship.137 
A playwright and a director who work as collaborators with 
the mutual intent of creating a piece of theater that is a single, 
unified whole are welcome to seek copyright protection for their 
work as joint authors.138 Limiting copyright to works that fit a 
joint authorship model, however, only protects new plays in 
their first productions and ignores the interpretive creativity of 
directing. One of the strengths of theater is the opportunity the 
 
 133. See Chinoy, supra note 25, at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005). 
 135. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 331–33 (noting that whether a director 
qualifies as a joint author is a circumstance-specific inquiry); Richard Amada, 
Note, Elvis Karaoke Shakespeare and the Search for a Copyrightable Stage Di-
rection, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 677, 691–93 (2001) (rejecting the idea of protecting 
the director as a joint author based on the unlikelihood of a director qualifying 
as such); Douglas M. Nevin, Note, No Business Like Show Business: Copyright 
Law, the Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1560–62 (2004) (asserting that “[t]he only feasible means of 
preserving the theatre’s group dynamic . . . requires the categorization of all 
collaborators within the joint authorship structure”).  
 136. KUSHNER, supra note 122, at 149. 
 137. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the 
district court’s finding that there was “absolutely no evidence whatever” that 
the playwright considered Lynn Thomson a coauthor of Rent); see also Amada, 
supra note 135, at 693 (concluding that courts will not likely consider a direc-
tor to be a joint author “absent an explicit agreement with the playwright”). 
 138. See Nevin, supra note 135, at 1561–62 (arguing that, by agreeing to 
see her script performed, a playwright implicitly intends to collaborate with a 
director). 
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art form affords for different artists to bring the same script to 
life in unique ways. Under a joint authorship regime, the direc-
tor of the first production of a play would share equal and un-
divided ownership rights with the playwright.139 Conferring 
copyright on the first production of a play might function to 
seal a single interpretation to the script and chill theatrical in-
novation. Such a chill would flout the constitutional purpose of 
copyright protection, which is to “promote . . . progress.”140 Fi-
nally, joint authorship offers no protection to subsequent direc-
tors of a copyrighted work or to directors of works in the public 
domain, leaving much creation uncovered. A different author-
ship scheme would better serve the interests of theater collabo-
rators and the public at large. 
3. The Flexibility of Derivative Works Protection 
Ultimately, the production the director creates is a deriva-
tive work. The Copyright Act extends protection to derivative 
works, which are based upon preexisting works.141 Congress 
conceived of derivative works as “recasting, transforming, or 
adapting” other works (copyrighted or not).142 The work of a di-
rector falls squarely within this definition. She takes a stack of 
pages—the script—and recasts or transforms those words into 
a live performance. At its heart, copyright law serves to protect 
“original work[s] of authorship.”143 While in most cases the di-
rector did not write the underlying script upon which a produc-
tion is based, she did author the conception of that production. 
Therefore, her authorship should be eligible for copyright as a 
derivative work, and several doctrinal means exist to facilitate 
this result. 
a. The Requirements and Bounds of Derivative Works 
Protection 
Granting directors protection as authors of derivative 
works offers a flexible arrangement, one that can accommodate 
first and subsequent productions of plays for which the play-
wright owns the copyright as well as productions of work in the 
public domain. The production of a play constitutes a work of 
 
 139. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 141. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005). 
 142. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5670. 
 143. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
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art distinct from the script itself. While the playwright creates 
a text to begin the process, the text only becomes a play—a 
work of art in real time on a stage—after it is handed over to a 
company of collaborators guided by the overall interpretation of 
the director.144 In other words, the translation of a script from 
page to stage is more than “mere reproduction of a work of art 
in a different medium,” which would likely not demonstrate 
enough originality to warrant copyright protection as a deriva-
tive work.145 Instead, the staging of a text exemplifies Con-
gress’s purpose in choosing to extend copyright protection to 
derivative works.146 At least one court has recognized the dis-
tinction between script and performance in the context of mo-
tion pictures.147 The same distinction holds when it comes to 
theater; the work of a director in staging a production should be 
protectable as a derivative work. 
Copyright in a derivative work covers only contributions 
independent of the underlying work.148 Therefore the text of the 
play and any stage directions the playwright wrote into the 
script would not be covered by a derivative copyright. Shakes-
peare, for example, indicates at one point in The Winter’s Tale 
that Antigonus is to “[e]xit, pursued by a bear.”149 A director 
who staged the exit with Antigonus chased off stage by an actor 
in a bear suit could hardly claim copyright protection for that 
literal interpretation of the text. 
Furthermore, to warrant protection as a derivative work, 
the director’s staging must “contain an original contribution not 
present in the underlying work of art and be more than a mere 
 
 144. See Ryan, supra note 108, at 198. 
 145. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (quot-
ing 1 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 20.2, at 94 (1975)). 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5670–71. 
 147. Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp., 897 F. Supp. 144, 147 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Although a screenplay [is] but a roadmap for fixing dialogue 
on the screen, and Defendant has shown minimal variation in the text of the 
Motion Picture, no court has gone so far as to hold that two such works are, by 
definition, one work . . . . [T]his Court declines to find that, as a matter of 
law, . . . the Screenplay is the same work as the Motion Picture . . . .” (altera-
tion in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), aff ’d in part, 
vacated and remanded in part, 168 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Nevin, su-
pra note 135, at 1563 (applying the reasoning of Shoptalk to theatrical per-
formance). 
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000). 
 149. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE act 3, sc. 3, at 54 
(Frances E. Dolan ed., Penguin Books 1999). 
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copy.”150 As mentioned earlier, originality does not pose a par-
ticularly high hurdle for the director seeking copyright protec-
tion.151 The director’s metamorphosis of script into performance 
is, in itself, original. It entails the realization of a vision, a syn-
thesis of a variety of elements—text, actors, scenery, lighting, 
and sound—into a coherent whole. 
Some theatrical productions will require the use of scenes à 
faire, or “incidents, characters, or settings which are as a prac-
tical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treat-
ment of a given topic.”152 Hamlet, for example, ends in an ela-
borate swordfight punctuated with poisoning.153 A director who 
staged the battle with epées, thrusts, and parries would simply 
be employing scenes à faire, and this element of her production 
would not be copyrightable. Staging the same scene with laser 
guns or bullwhips, however, would likely demonstrate the re-
quisite originality for copyright protection.154 While one can 
imagine a director’s contribution that relies on scenes à faire to 
such a degree that it contains no originality at all, most produc-
tions will easily clear the minimal originality requirement for 
the purposes of copyright law. 
Many contemporary scripts deliberately leave much room 
for the director’s contribution. Terrence McNally’s Love! Val-
our! Compassion!, for example, begins with a simple stage di-
rection: “Bare stage.”155 In the New York production, the direc-
tor Joe Mantello interpreted this by staging “a tableau of all 
the characters arranged on a green knoll around a doll house 
representing the home where they are spending the week-
end.”156 Arguably, Mantello’s contribution to the production of 
Love! Valour! Compassion! was independent from McNally’s 
underlying script and original enough to earn copyright. The 
 
 150. L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 151. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice.”). 
 152. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 94, act 5, sc. 2. 
 154. Such protection may be thin, however, more akin to a compilation 
copyright where the second-comer is barred from duplicating the same selec-
tion or arrangement. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. Nonetheless, thin protection 
still bars slavish copying. 
 155. See Green, supra note 8. 
 156. Id. 
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eligibility of a director’s contributions for derivative copyright 
protection would require a case-by-case inquiry, but many 
scripts allow for the addition of independent originality in the 
production, and many directorial interpretations demonstrate 
it.157 
Finally, some commentators lament the fact that deriva-
tive copyright offers directors little protection because they 
would be unable to license their work without the permission of 
the playwright, owner of the underlying copyright.158 Gilliam v. 
American Broadcasting Cos. makes clear that, because “the 
ability of the copyright holder to control his work remains pa-
ramount in our copyright law,” the owner of copyright in a de-
rivative work cannot use that copyright in a way that infringes 
on the underlying copyright.159 In other words, it would be im-
possible for a director to license his direction of a play to a third 
party without implicating the underlying play, which remains 
the playwright’s alone to license for public performance. In fact, 
when the Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers as-
serts that directors hold intellectual property rights in their 
productions, it does so with the understanding that these rights 
are distinct from and do not diminish those of the writer.160 
Despite these criticisms, the derivative-works copyright 
remains the most flexible and fair means of extending protec-
tion to theater directors, who are currently without recourse if 
their production concepts are copied or used without permis-
sion.161 A derivative copyright cannot be exploited in a way that 
infringes the copyright of the underlying work; a director, for 
example, cannot “perform” or “display” her copyrighted work 
 
 157. In an infringement action, a court would be tasked with determining 
what constitutes the director’s contribution independent of the underlying 
script. Various tests exist for determining what constitutes copyrightable ex-
pression, and these tests, which have functioned in the much more technical 
realm of computer programming, could be employed effectively here as well. 
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 
1992) (adopting a three-part “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test); Roth 
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (ex-
amining the “total concept and feel” of two works); see also Amada, supra note 
135, at 701–06 (suggesting a combination of tests for courts to determine if the 
work of a stage director is copyrightable at all). 
 158. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 335. 
 159. 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 160. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 341–43. 
 161. See, e.g., Green, supra note 8 (illustrating specific examples of copy-
right controversies involving theater directors). 
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without the permission of the playwright.162 Therefore, grant-
ing directors copyright in their production concepts as deriva-
tive works does not derogate the rights of playwrights; instead, 
it allows directors to protect their own creativity from unau-
thorized, uncompensated, and unacknowledged reproduction. 
b. Doctrinal Means of Establishing the Director’s Derivative 
Works Copyright 
One of the bundle of rights inherent in copyright protection 
is the right to “prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work.”163 This reserved right means that the playwright 
controls the ability of the director to prepare a derivative work 
based on the playwright’s underlying script. Three basic doc-
trinal solutions—permission, compulsory licensing, and an im-
plied right to create derivative works—exist through which a 
director can secure the ability to make a copyrightable deriva-
tive work based on a playwright’s underlying script.164 
i. Permission 
The director could seek the permission of the playwright to 
prepare a derivative work. This solution places the burden on 
the director, the party seeking to use the playwright’s copy-
right. Because the playwright also retains the right “to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly,”165 the director already must 
seek the playwright’s permission in order to direct the script. 
At the same time, the director could seek permission to create a 
derivative work based on that script; a single contract or other 
written instrument could encompass both permissions. The di-
rector’s right to create a derivative work would be contingent 
on the playwright’s permission, but securing the right to create 
a derivative work should not be any more onerous than seeking 
the playwright’s permission to stage the play in the first place. 
The playwright, aware both of the essentially collaborative na-
ture of creating plays and the fact that the creation of a deriva-
tive work in no way diminishes the playwright’s own copyright 
 
 162. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006) (enumerating the exclu-
sive rights of copyright). 
 163. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 164. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the In-
ternet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 578–84 (1997) (discussing three solutions to 
transmission on the Internet, including a new “right of net transmission”). 
 165. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
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in the underlying work,166 should have little reason to object to 
the granting of this right to the director. 
ii. Compulsory Licensing 
Second, Congress could introduce a compulsory licensing 
scheme not unlike that used in the music industry. Section 115 
of the Copyright Act establishes a compulsory licensing frame-
work for recording artists seeking to cover the works of other 
artists.167 Where § 115 denies these recordings protection as 
derivative works,168 Congress could draft a theatrical compul-
sory licensing system to extend derivative works protection to 
the contributions of directors. The playwright would therefore 
be compensated for supplying the source material for the direc-
tor’s derivative work. Furthermore, the playwright could nego-
tiate with the director to contract around this extension of de-
rivative works protection. The main obstacle to this solution 
reflects the insufficiency of contract as a means of protecting 
directors. The players in theater, compared to other entertain-
ment and culture industries, lack clout and are unlikely to be 
able to lobby Congress successfully for independent statutory 
protection. 
iii. Implied Right to Create Derivative Works 
The third solution, an implied right to create a derivative 
work in the case of theater, takes the logic of the permission so-
lution to its natural end. In addition to its enumerated rights, 
copyright law grants several implied rights, such as an author’s 
implied rights to choose not to make her work available and to 
limit a consumer’s autonomy in accessing her work.169 In the 
case of theater, an implied right to create a derivative work 
would recognize the fact that a playwright knows that staging a 
script is a necessarily collaborative process. Therefore, by li-
censing her script to a director for a public performance, the 
playwright would also grant that director the right to create a 
derivative work based on her script. The burden in this case is 
 
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000). 
 167. Id. § 115. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine to 
Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing Digital 
Technologies, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 111, 116–24 (2005) (discussing the Copy-
right Act’s implied rights of availability, limited access, limited use, and au-
tonomy). 
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on the playwright to expressly withhold the right to create de-
rivative works. Playwrights would be less likely to do so, how-
ever, if the grant of the right is the default rule. While Con-
gress could create this right by amending the exclusive rights 
granted by copyright, the implied right to create derivative 
works could also be read into transactions between playwrights 
and directors by courts. Given the increasing number of law-
suits brought by directors asserting a copyright interest in 
their intellectual property, the judicial creation of an implied 
right to create derivative works is the strongest doctrinal solu-
tion to the issue of directorial control. 
III.  THE RELAXATION OF THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
AND THE EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO 
THE WORK OF DIRECTORS   
Stage direction, just coming into its own as a visionary, in-
novative theatrical art form, deserves protection. Currently, di-
rectors have no control over the exploitation of their work, and 
their investment and creativity are not protected. Copyright 
protection can promote the progress of stage direction by ex-
tending protection to the investment and creativity of all direc-
tors, the emerging and the established alike, as long as their 
work fulfills the basic statutory requirements. 
Just like any other copyright, a derivative copyright re-
quires original authorship and fixation.170 The artistic contri-
bution of a director to most theatrical productions easily satis-
fies these mandates—it is both original and authored. The final 
obstacle to protecting the work of the theater director as a de-
rivative work is the fixation requirement. Presently, live 
theatrical performance is not copyrightable because it is not 
fixed; however, the fixation requirement has been diluted by 
Congress and interpreted by courts in such a way to render it 
functionally equivalent with perceptibility.171 The contribution 
of a director is certainly perceptible; if it were not, it would not 
be repeatable performance after performance during the run of 
a play. Even more crucially for the purposes of copyright pro-
tection, if a director’s work were not perceptible, others would 
be unable to copy it. The proliferation of lawsuits in the past 
 
 170. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a); see also Entm’t Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis 
Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Durham In-
dus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 171. See supra notes 76–87 and accompanying text. 
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fifteen years proves the lie of the assertion that a director’s 
work is not sufficiently fixed to be copied. Ultimately, the work 
of a director is as perceptible as a software loop or a television 
broadcast of a football game and should therefore be offered 
similar copyright protection. 
A. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL DILUTION OF THE FIXATION 
REQUIREMENT 
For all practical purposes, Congress has already extended 
copyright protection to live performance. When Congress made 
simultaneously recorded broadcasts copyrightable in the 1976 
Copyright Act, it in effect extended protection to momentary 
events.172 Congress described this new protection as covering 
works “that are reaching the public in unfixed form but that 
are simultaneously being recorded.”173 It is challenging to un-
derstand why this provision does not apply to a play that is 
recorded (perhaps by videotape) while simultaneously being 
performed. After all, a play reaches its audience “in unfixed 
form” but is recordable. The example Congress cites as its rea-
son for extending this new protection, however, is particularly 
instructive: 
When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, 
with a director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and 
choosing which of their electronic images are sent out to the public 
and in what order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and 
the director are doing constitutes “authorship.” The further question 
to be considered is whether there has been a fixation. If the images 
and sounds to be broadcast are first recorded . . . and then transmit-
ted, the recorded work would be considered a “motion picture” subject 
to statutory protection against unauthorized reproduction or re-
transmission of the broadcast. If the program content is transmitted 
live to the public while being recorded at the same time, the case 
would be treated the same.174 
Certainly the work of a theater director is at least as original, 
for authorship purposes, as coordinating camera operators and 
sequencing imagery, and a play is as easily recorded during 
performance as a football game. While a theatrical performance 
is not “transmitted” like the broadcast of a football game, the 
meaningful difference here comes down to money. 
 
 172. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
 173. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5665. 
 174. Id. 
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In 2004, the National Football League, in a season that 
runs just six months during which each team plays no more 
than one game a week, earned a total revenue of $5.3 billion.175 
The total box office receipts for Broadway and touring produc-
tions in the 2004–05 season, which ran year round and usually 
featured at least eight performances a week at each venue, to-
taled $1.4 billion.176 The stakes for football, with its corporate 
sponsorships and big television contracts, are different from 
theater by an order of magnitude.177 Moreover, these figures, 
reflecting commercial theater, do not account for artists like 
Edward Einhorn, working in a small off-Broadway theater for a 
single fee of $1000.178 Ultimately, the difference is formalistic. 
Congress has extended protection to live events being transmit-
ted through its revision of § 101, and there is no principled rea-
son for denying this protection to theatrical performance, if 
fixed through recordation. 
Congress went even further in relaxing the fixation re-
quirement with its passage of § 1101(a), adopted to bring the 
United States in line with the other signatories of the TRIPS 
Agreement.179 This anti-bootlegging provision is another exam-
ple of protecting evanescent or transitory events by barring the 
unauthorized fixation of a live musical performance.180 Unlike 
the new definition of fixation in § 101, this provision does not 
extend copyright protection to the performer; instead, it allows 
the performer to prevent others from fixing her work without 
her permission.181 Although a weaker solution, an analogous 
framework could suffice to protect a theater director. In such a 
scheme, the director would not own copyright in her work. In-
stead, she would be able to stop others from copying her work 
without her permission. 
In fact, much of Congress’s recent copyright legislation has 
functioned to harmonize the United States system with other 
 
 175. Michael K. Ozanian, Football Fiefdoms, FORBES.COM, Sept. 3, 2004, 
http://www.forbes.com/business/2004/09/02/cz_kb_0902nflintro.html. 
 176. Variety.com, Charts and Data, http://www.variety.com/index.asp? 
layout=chart_pass&charttype=chart_bwaycombined (last visited Oct. 14, 
2007). 
 177. See Ozanian, supra note 175. 
 178. Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 179. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. 1, at 8 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3780. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (2000). 
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nations.182 If such harmonization is really one of Congress’s 
goals, then one cannot help but wonder about the persistent 
disclaimer of moral rights in United States copyright law.183 As 
long as an economic purpose underlies copyright law, many col-
laborative artists—some of whom are for a good reason referred 
to colloquially as “starving”—will go unprotected. Congress 
need not go so far as to modify the traditional purpose of copy-
right law, however, in order to protect the intellectual property 
contributions of theater directors. It has already extended pro-
tection to live events, and to do the same for theatrical perfor-
mance would be doctrinally indistinguishable. 
B. RECENT JUDICIAL DILUTION OF THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
Case law in the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals has interpreted the fixation requirement as flexible, par-
ticularly when considering computer programs. Computers 
were a new technology when Congress passed the 1976 Copy-
right Act, and courts have been tasked with fitting the statuto-
ry provisions to the needs of this unprecedented form of expres-
sion. Similarly, given its late ascendancy in the American 
theater, direction could be seen as a new development that can 
be accommodated by the flexibility of copyright law. 
In Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, for example, the court rea-
soned that because computer matrices could be recreated with 
identical input, they were sufficiently fixed for the purposes of 
copyright law.184 Theatrical performances are similarly repeat-
able with the same input, only the input is not data but the col-
laborative contributions of the actors and designers as curated 
by the director. One could argue that truly identical input is 
impossible when it comes to an endeavor as human as theater, 
which often involves volatile, artistic personalities. That argu-
 
 182. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003) (“[A] key fac-
tor in the [Copyright Term Extension Act]’s passage was a 1993 European Un-
ion (EU) directive instructing EU members to establish a copyright term of life 
plus 70 years. . . . [T]he EU directed its members to deny this longer term to 
the works of any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same ex-
tended term. By extending the baseline United States copyright term, . . . 
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same cop-
yright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 183. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 75, pt. II, § 1, art. 9(1) (allowing 
countries to not adopt the Berne Convention’s requirement that moral rights 
be recognized). 
 184. 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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ment, however, favors the creativity of machines over that of 
artists, and the Constitution, after all, empowers Congress to 
“secure[] . . . to Authors,” not machines, “the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Writings.”185 
Furthermore, as MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 
demonstrates, even fleeting, momentary fixations in the memo-
ry system of a computer, perceivable only by a machine, are 
considered sufficiently fixed to earn copyright.186 While this 
corruption of the fixation requirement may be a reaction to the 
needs of the financially robust computer industry, in practice it 
functions to redefine what fixation means. A theatrical perfor-
mance, even one that is not recorded, is perceptible without the 
aid of a machine, even if it is similarly fleeting. If an important 
underpinning of the fixation requirement is the enforcement of 
copyright infringement actions, as at least one court has ar-
gued,187 then several means of fixation exist, including videore-
cording and notation,188 that would sufficiently serve theater. 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Micro Star v. Formgen 
Inc. that descriptive fixation sufficed for statutory purposes.189 
A computer file that fixes an audiovisual display is analytically 
indistinguishable from notation or a videorecording that fixes 
stage direction—Judge Kozinski, in fact, relies on this analogy 
in his opinion, describing a melody as fixed in sheet music and 
pantomimes fixed if “‘described in sufficient detail to enable the 
work to be performed from that description.’”190 Directing, be it 
recorded or notated, is similarly fixed enough to allow work to 
be performed, as demonstrated by the copying cases that have 
already been filed. Under the reasoning of Micro Star, directing 
is already fixed, and therefore it deserves copyright protection. 
Sports cases, where courts have held that broadcasts are 
copyrightable while the underlying game is not, are distin-
guishable.191 In National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., the 
 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 186. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“[W]e hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy un-
der the Copyright Act.”); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 
158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 187. See Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 702–03. 
 188. Notation suffices to fix the work of choreographers. See Sheila A. Sko-
jec, Annotation, Copyright of Dance or Choreography, 85 A.L.R. FED. 906, 907 
(1987). 
 189. 154 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 190. See id. at 1112. 
 191. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 
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court relied on the improvisational nature of sports perfor-
mance, which has no “underlying script” and is prone to mis-
takes regardless of how much practice precedes the game, when 
it held that a basketball game was not copyrightable.192 In fact, 
the opportunity to copy—and perhaps perfect—the feats of oth-
er athletes is essential to the particular kind of competition 
that lies at the heart of sport.193 Most theatrical productions, 
however, are based on an underlying script. Where practice in 
sports functions to ready a team to respond dynamically and 
opportunistically to variables, rehearsal in theater strives to 
shape a performance that will be repeatable as designed in 
spite of variables. Mistakes in theater are just that—deviations 
from what is supposed to happen, not the product of interactive 
competition. Based on this reasoning, the director’s work in 
creating a performance out of an underlying script deserves 
copyright protection. 
Finally, one court in the Ninth Circuit has extended copy-
right protection to a live event—a movie pitch.194 In Metrano v. 
Fox Broadcasting Co., the court found that an outline and note 
cards sufficed for the purposes of fixing the screenwriter’s ideas 
as he expressed them.195 Although the Bleistein nondiscrimina-
tion principle counsels courts to refrain from making aesthetic 
judgments,196 the slippery slope is apparent: if a movie pitch is 
fixable, so should be a theatrical performance.197 Several direc-
tors have applied for copyright protection for their work, sub-
mitting annotated scripts indicating their stage directions.198 In 
 
1997). Contra Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 
F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 192. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 846. 
 193. See id. (“A claim of being the only athlete to perform a feat doesn’t 
mean much if no one else is allowed to try.”). A court in the Ninth Circuit con-
curs. See Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434, 
1437 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 194. See Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. CV-00-02279 CAS (JWJX), 2000 
WL 979664, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (finding a movie pitch fixed in an 
outline and note cards). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) 
(“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
 197. Again, here, economic considerations may be at play. The movie in-
dustry is richer than theater, and a movie pitch on one level really is a com-
mercial transaction. 
 198. See Yellin, supra note 110, at 328 (discussing the registration of Ge-
rald Gutierrez’s copyright for his direction of The Most Happy Fella); Nevin, 
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response, the United States Copyright Office has classified 
those registrations as “literary authorship,” restricting protec-
tion to the “text of stage directions.”199 The insufficiency of this 
solution is apparent; it is not the copying of the written direc-
tions but their embodiment on stage that is at issue. 
The work of both the legislature and the courts has diluted 
the fixation requirement. When examined according to the 
standards applied to computer programs or sporting events, a 
theatrical performance ought to be considered fixed. For the 
purposes of an infringement action, fixation in either recording 
or notation should be sufficient to demonstrate copying. Ulti-
mately, the statutory requirement that work be fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression poses no real barrier to copy-
right protection for the creative, original work of authorship 
that is stage direction. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Copyright Act represents an antiquated view of the 
American theater, one that elevates the work of the playwright 
above the contributions of her collaborators. In many of today’s 
theatrical productions, the director is the driving force. The 
staging of a play, be it classic or contemporary, represents “the 
original outgrowth of a director’s imagination.”200 The director’s 
contribution, however, is not yet copyrightable. A second-comer 
is free to watch a show, take notes, and recreate it elsewhere 
without licensing the work or giving the original director credit. 
On an economic level, the original director is robbed of the 
chance to be compensated for directing the work in another ve-
nue. More importantly, on a moral level, creative work is sto-
len. 
 
supra note 135, at 1557 n.153 (noting the trend of directors copyrighting their 
stage directions). 
 199. Yellin, supra note 110, at 327–28 (“Reference to ‘stage directions’ in an 
application, however, does not imply any protection for a manner, style or me-
thod of directing, or for the actions dictated by them.”) (quoting the United 
States Copyright Office’s response to a director’s submission of his prompt 
book, an annotated copy of the script indicating all stage directions added by 
the director, for copyright registration). This classification raises the issue of 
which category of copyrightable work in § 102 encompasses the work of stage 
directors. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Stage direction could perhaps be copy-
righted as a “dramatic work.” Id. § 102(a)(3). Another option would be to con-
sider stage direction akin to choreography, id. § 102(a)(4), which can be fixed 
through “dance notation, film, and videotape.” Skojec, supra note 188, at 907. 
 200. Charles Marowitz, Letter to the Editor, What the Director Brings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 2, at 4. 
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The current copyright scheme in this country is sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the copyright claims of stage directors. 
By transforming a stack of pages into a live performance, a di-
rector demonstrates sufficient originality. Because the perfor-
mance is based on a script usually written by another, the di-
rector is not the sole author of her creation but instead is the 
author of a derivative work. The most onerous obstacle to copy-
righting stage direction is the requirement that the director’s 
work be fixed. Theater, by its nature, is a fleeting live event. 
Since 1976, however, Congress has weakened the fixation re-
quirement in order to accommodate live broadcasts and to pre-
vent bootlegging. Judicial opinions, particularly those concern-
ing computer programs and sporting events, have further 
weakened the idea of fixation. As it stands today, the work of a 
director, particularly if it is recorded or notated, is sufficiently 
fixed for the purposes of copyright protection. The resulting 
protection may be thin, but it would be enough to prevent 
another from shamelessly stealing a director’s work. 
What is required, more than anything, is a leap of faith. As 
long as the focus on the economic underpinnings of copyright 
law dominates the discourse, judges will characterize the 
claims of an underpaid amateur director like Edward Einhorn 
as making a mountain out of a molehill. Instead, the story of 
Tam Lin is one of weeks of unpaid and unrecognized work. Ul-
timately, protecting the intellectual property rights of direc-
tors—and directors here stand synecdochically for all theatrical 
collaborators, including designers and dramaturgs—is a moral 
issue, and recognizing the moral implications of these artists’ 
copyright claims would further bring the United States in line 
with other TRIPS Agreement signatories. Finally, protecting 
the work of directors would promote progress. Many theater di-
rectors are not paid handsomely in cash; extending copyright 
protection to their work, however humble, affords another kind 
of payment altogether: respect. 
